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CHANGING BOUNDARIES: CHILD ABUSE,
PUBLIC HEALTH, AND SEPARATION OF

CHURCH AND STATE
Brian K. Gran and Laurel Gaddie*

INTRODUCTION
The public and private boundaries for health care are often
fuzzy. Public health responsibilities are often provided by private
organizations. In turn, these private organizations frequently rely
on public funds and are regulated by the government. We argue
that changes in the legal doctrines separating church and state will

have an important impact on these fuzzy boundaries for public
health. In this article, we consider the question of whether the
provision of services to abused children by a religious-based,
state-funded organizational provider is constitutional. The answer
to this question has far-reaching implications for the American
welfare state. Perhaps more important, trying to answer this
question will
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shake and perhaps dismantle fundamental assumptions on which
the American welfare state and separation of church and state
were built. This question speaks to contemporary proposals for
Charitable Choice as well as current Charitable Choice policy.'
Answering this question will force policymakers and officers of
the legal system to evaluate the rights and protections that
contemporary U.S. society provides to its children, particularly its
most vulnerable children.
This article is divided into five parts. The first part
marshals evidence to contend that child abuse is a public health
issue. The second part describes the organization of services to
child-abuse victims, suggesting that, although child abuse is a
public health issue, providers of child-abuse services are often
private. The third part considers whether provision of services to
abused children by a religious-based, state-funded organizational
provider is constitutional. The fourth part considers some legal
standards to which religious organizations providing welfare
services may be held. In the fifth part, we conclude with a review
of public health's relationship to religious organizations, the
direction in which this relationship is headed, and implications for
whether the state can adequately protect the interests and rights of
abused children.

Charitable Choice legislation instructs the federal government not to
discriminate against faith-based organizations in awarding government
contracts that support beneficiaries in making the transition from welfare to
work. This legislation also allows faith-based organizations to witness their
religious beliefs, but prohibits faith-based organizations from
discriminating against a program beneficiary on the basis of the
beneficiary's religion or forcing the beneficiary to participate in worship
activities. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). The
Bush Charitable Choice policy will potentially apply to all kinds of social
services.
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CHILD ABUSE: A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE ?
The first question we confront is whether child abuse is a
public issue. We accept the definition of public health offered by
the World Health Organization (WHO), which is the "physical,
mental and environmental health concerns of communities and
populations at risk for disease and injury." 2 The mission of public
health is to "fulfill society's interest in assuring conditions in
which people can be healthy."3 According to the U.S. Institute of
Medicine, public health has three core functions:
(1) assessment and monitoring of the health of
communities and populations at risk to identify
health problems and priorities; (2) formulating
public policies, in collaboration with community
and government leaders, designed to solve
identified local and national health problems and
priorities; [and] (3) assuring that all populations
have access to appropriate and cost-effective care,
including health promotion and disease prevention
4
services.
Is child abuse a public health issue? According to the
WHO, child abuse is a public health problem and should be
approached as a public health issue. Child abuse is widespread in
the United States. Children who face abuse often suffer both
physical and mental injuries and are at risk for abuse in the
future.5
2

3

4

5

Ass'n of Sch. of Pub. Health, at http:www.asph.org/aa_section.cfm/3 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002).

INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB.
HEALTH,

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 7 (National Academy Press) (1988).

Id. at 145.

U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Admin. on Children, Youth and
Families: Child Maltreatment 1999, at
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According to data from the Administration on Children and
Families, there were an estimated 2,974,000 referrals of child
abuse or neglect to relevant state or local agencies in 1999.6 These
referrals resulted in an estimated 826,000 confirmed victims of
7
maltreatment, a rate of 11.8 per 1,000 children nationwide.
Beyond the disturbing number of child abuse victims is the kind
of abuse these victims suffer. Of the 826,000 victims in 1999,
11.3 percent suffered sexual abuse, 21.3 percent suffered physical
abuse, and 58.4 percent suffered neglect. Of these victims, 35.9
percent were victims of more than one type of maltreatment.8 Of
course, child abuse can be fatal: approximately 1,100 children
died of abuse or neglect in 1998, a rate of 1.6 deaths per 100,000
children. Within all forms of abuse, about 75 percent of the
9
perpetrators were parents.
Across the United States, an estimated 143,000 child
victims were placed in foster care in 1998. Another 33,000
children were placed in the care and supervision of child welfare
agencies, either in protective supervision or for a time during
investigation. Victims from families with financial problems,
prior victims, and victims of multiple incidents of maltreatment
were

6

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm99/cpt2.htm (last
visited Sept. 4, 2002).
See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Admin. on Children,
Youth
and Families: Child Maltreatment 1999, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm99/high.htm
(last
visited Sept. 4, 2002); see Douglas Besharov, Protecting Children from
Abuse and Neglect, in FOUR COMMENTARIES: HOW WE CAN BETTER
PROTECT CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 8 (1998) (explaining that

7

8

9

65 percent of child abuse reports in 1995 were "unfounded").

CompareThe Nat'l Crime Victimization Survey, Rape Victimization Rates
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/rape.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2002)
(explaining that 1 person per 1,000 U.S. residents age 12 and older was
raped in the United States in 1998).
Besharov, supra note 6.
Id.

2002-2003

Separationof Church andState

more likely to 0receive services than were victims without these
characteristics. 1
It seems beyond disagreement that child abuse has serious
consequences, with enormous implications for victims as well as
the societies in which the victims live. For victims, the effects of
child abuse are both immediate and long-term. If a child's life is
not extinguished by abuse, he or she will hopefully receive
treatment and care, perhaps for an extensive period. The larger
society loses out on potential contributions made by victims as
well as resources needed to treat the victims and their families and
friends. Of course, resources are employed by the criminal justice
and health care systems to penalize and treat the perpetrators."
One estimate of the costs of child abuse is over $94 billion dollars
per year. 12 In comparison, Head Start, the federal program that
provides services to low-income families and their children, costs
approximately $4.658 billion in 1999, while Medicaid costs $19.3
13
billion.
PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
U.S. society frequently relies on "private" providers to
treat child abuse victims. Many state governments do not directly
provide treatment to child abuse victims. Instead, state
governments fund private providers. Researchers contend that
10 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Admin. on Children, Youth and

Families: Admin. On Children, Youth and Families, Children's Bureau
1999, Child Welfare Outcomes 1999: Annual Report, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cwo99/index.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2002).
Total Estimated Costs of Child Abuse and Neglect in the United States, at
http://www.preventchildabuse.org/learn-more/research.html (last visited
Oct 5, 2002).

12 Id.
13
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 106TH CONG., 2000 GREEN
BOOK

(U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE).

930, 973
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most providers of child abuse services are private but funded by
state contracts. 14 One survey done by Stephen Monsma indicated
that 90 percent of child service agencies are in a service contract
relationship with the government.' 5 It is reasonable to believe that6
many child abuse victims receive help from private providers.'
For instance, the Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children (KBHC)
is the largest private childcare provider in Kentucky for children
who have been abused, neglected or whose families are in crisis.
The agency assists more than 3,800 children and adults each
year. 17
This anecdote indicates that child abuse services, while
typically considered a responsibility of state government, are often
provided by private organizations. To be more clear, child abuse
services are an example of public health services provided by
private organizations. This instance is a good example of when
the boundary separating the public and private sectors for U.S.
social policy is fuzzy. Public health is considered a government
responsibility, yet many state governments do not provide services
to abused children. Instead, a state government enters a contract
with a private organization to provide services to abused children.
This fuzziness, as we will explain, may become a problem in the
future.
PRIVATE PROVIDERS ARE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
This fuzzy boundary separating the public and private
sectors for U.S. social policy may assume more religious
overtones in the future. The Bush administration has promoted the

14

See generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX

'5

(1996).
Id. at 65.
Telephone Interview with William G. Steiner, National Program Director,

16

17

Childhelp USA (Feb. 1, 2002).
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, at http://www.kbhc.org/acluhist.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
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Faith-Based Initiative as a way to "strengthen and expand
grassroots and faith-based services." 18 The Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives "works with federal agencies,
Congress, and state and local governments to promote policy,
legal, and regulatory changes. It also works with private
philanthropies, the nonprofit sector, businesses, America's many
faith communities, and neighborhood groups to encourage,
inform, and strengthen a renewed commitment to community
service." 19 At the heart of President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative
is Charitable Choice, the direct government funding of religious
organizations for the purpose of carrying out government
programs.
Charitable Choice is not new. In 1996, then Senator John
Ashcroft proposed Charitable Choice legislation, which became
part of the welfare reform legislation. Similar legislation was
recently passed affecting drug treatment and prevention
programs. 2 1 This legislation has five important components
relevant to this article:

18

19

20

21

The Faith-Based Initiative is an effort to ensure that faith-based and
community organizations can compete for federal funds to provide social
services in an effective manner. White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives,
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci/fourpage-ofbci.pdf (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002).
Rallying the Armies of Compassion 14, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/Reports/faithbased.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 107, 114 Stat.
2763 (2001).
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1. The government cannot discriminate against a
nonprofit on the basis of its religious character.
2. Congregational grantees cannot discriminate
against a program beneficiary on the basis of
religion.
3. Congregational grantees cannot force a program
beneficiary to participate in worship activities.
4. Accessible secular alternatives must be made
available to beneficiaries who object to
participation in the congregation's program.
5. The government cannot exercise control over the
22
religious beliefs of the congregational provider.
The Bush administration's conception of Charitable
Choice, however, is distinct in at least one important way.
Government officials associated with the Faith-Based Initiative
have indicated that, under the Bush Charitable Choice Policy, a
religious organization can require a program beneficiary to
participate in worship activities. The Bush Charitable Choice
Policy will also clearly shift the burden onto program
beneficiaries to object to placement in a religious based program.
Some "private providers" of child-abuse services are
religious institutions. Of the private agencies surveyed by
Monsma, many have a basis in religious faith. Monsma found that
63 percent of the agencies reported that more than 20 percent of
their budget is from government funds. 23 Many religious providers
22
23

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(d)(1), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
Monsma, supra note 14, at 64-65, 68; Brian K. Gran, Charitable Choice
Policy and Abused Children: The Benefits and Harms of Going Beyond

Public-Private Dichotomy, INT'L J. OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOC. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with the author). Gran is
undertaking research on the different forms of relationships between
government and social service agencies that provide services to abused
children. He has examined completed IRS form 990s available through the
National Center for Charitable Statistics of the Urban Institute. Of the
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receive and use state and federal funding to provide services to
abused children. In 1998, 57 percent KBHC's budget was from
the Kentucky government. 24 The relationship between the
Kentucky state government and KBHC, already in existence, is an
example of the kind of relationships the Bush administration's
Charitable Choice Policy seeks to encourage.
CHARITABLE CHOICE: A VIOLATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE ?
The receipt of public funds by religious organizations as
envisioned in Charitable Choice Policy not only is a debate of
constitutional law, the consequences of the Charitable Choice
Policy for the relationship between religious organizations and
government may be unanticipated. Many legal scholars contend
the receipt of public funds by religious organizations violates the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Can religious
organizations receive public funds to provide social services
without violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?
Although some legal scholars have considered these
questions, legal cases have not directly posed this question for a
court to consider and decide, until Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist
Homes for Children.25 In Pedreira, Alicia Pedreira and other
plaintiffs are suing KBHC and other defendants for her
termination from employment with KBHC.
KBHC is managed on the basis of Baptist beliefs and
principles. It requires employees to exhibit values and conduct, a
lifestyle consistent with its "Christian" mission. Pedreira was
hired and worked as a therapist of boys and young men who had
seventy-one social service organizations providing services to abused
children analyzed by his research, seventeen of them are faith-based
24

organizations.
Eyal Press, Faith-BasedFuror,N.Y.

25

186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001).

TIMES,

Apr. 1, 2001, at 62.
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been abused. At the time Pedreira was hired, she informed her
immediate supervisor, the same person who hired her, that she
was a lesbian and did not want to take the job if she would be later
terminated because of her sexual orientation. Her immediate
supervisor suggested that Pedreira take a "don't ask, don't tell
approach." Between her hiring and termination, Pedreira's job
performance was satisfactory and she received increases in pay.
Later, Pedreira's picture was taken by a photographer during a gay
rights parade. In the picture, Pedreira was embraced by her thenlover and wore a T-shirt that said "Isle of Lesbos." This
photographer entered the picture in a photographic competition at
the Kentucky State Fair. A KBHC board member saw the picture
during the competition, recognized Pedreira, and sought her
dismissal. KBHC eventually fired Pedreira, stating that Pedreira's
sexual orientation conflicted with KBHC's beliefs and principles
26
despite her satisfactory job performance.
A core issue in the lawsuit, however, was whether KBHC
was a private or public entity. Nearly 60 percent of KBHC's
budget is from the Kentucky state government. As of the writing
of this article, parts of Pedreira have been dismissed by the
Western District Court of Kentucky and are under appeal before
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 27 The District Court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims alleging religious discrimination in employment
and denied the motion to dismiss the Establishment Clause
28
claim.
Pedreira is a test case for the Bush Charitable Choice
Policy. If receipt of public funds by religious organizations is
declared unconstitutional, not only will the constitutional validity
of the Bush Charitable Choice Policy be questioned, but the loss
of public funds may strongly hinder, even prevent, religious
organizations from providing welfare services. This loss may
26
27

28

See generally id. at 759-60.
Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist: Homes for Children, Inc., Nos. 016475
and
016509 (6th Cir.).
Pedreira,186 F. Supp. 2d at 762, 766.
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require either direct provision of some kinds of welfare services
by state governments or the deterioration of those welfare
services. These complications are especially troubling given how
Charitable Choice Policy is expected to work in practice. The
burden of objecting to placement with a faith-based program will
be placed on the shoulders of the client, who in the case of child
abuse services, is the child and his or her advocate.
For the remainder of this article, we will first consider
whether the receipt of public funds by a religious organization
violates the Establishment Clause, which requires a brief review
of some relevant Supreme Court cases in the convoluted area of
separation of church and state. We will also consider the direction
in which legal arguments are headed when trying to decide
whether religious organizations can receive public funds to
provide religious services.
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
An important question confronting a religious organization
wanting to receive or already receiving public funds is whether
that receipt violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Different constitutional tests are applied to
determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated.
The Establishment Clause is found in the First Amendment,
which reads "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
29
for a redress of grievances."
For the purposes of this article, we will examine
contemporary tests for determining whether an actor or
organization has violated the Establishment Clause. These tests

29

U.S. CONST amend. I.
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include the Lemon v. Kurtzman30 test, the Endorsement test, and
the Coercion test. We will then consider the implications of these
tests for the Pedreiralawsuit.
The dominant test for determining whether the
government has violated the Establishment Clause is the Lemon
test. The Lemon test requires that: (1) the law must have a secular
purpose; (2) the law's "principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; 3 1 and (3) the law
"must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 32 Lemon considered whether a parochial school could
30
31

32

403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
Id. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). Bd.
of Educ. is the source of the second prong. As discussed below, the third
prong appears to have been folded into the second prong in the Supreme
Court's current Lemon test articulated in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)). Since Lemon was decided, the test explained therein has
undergone changes. Important cases relevant to these changes are
discussed in this article and include Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (discussed
below); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (discussed below);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (explaining factors evaluated to
determine excessive entanglement are similar to factors evaluated to
determine whether effect advances or inhibits religion); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (discussed below); County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(discussed below); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (discussed
below); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (discussed below);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(Government aid recipient who privately chose to use aid by attending
religious school did not advance religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (Louisiana statute authorizing one-minute period of silence in
public schools did not have a secular purpose); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (Minnesota statute allowing parents to use government aid to
send their children to parochial school by permitting parents to claim tax
deduction for sending children to school did not violated the Establishment
Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (New York statute provided for government to reimburse
nonpublic school for administering state-prescribed examinations and for
grading two exams ruled constitutional).
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receive public funding. Public funds paid part of the teachers'
salaries and assisted with the purchase of textbooks and teaching
supplies. The Lemon court found that parochial teachers are
agents of a religion. To ensure that the teachers do not play an
ideological role, the state would have to become excessively
entangled in religion to maintain the separation of church and
state. The Supreme Court (the "Court") found that students are
young children, who are impressionable and perhaps incapable of
distinguishing the state from the church, to be significant. The age
of the observers of possible church-state entanglement has
remained a critical factor in the Court's and other courts' analyses
of whether the disputed state activity is constitutional.
The Court has given its most recent interpretation of the
Lemon test in two decisions, Mitchell v. Helms33 and Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.34 After reviewing each prong of the Lemon test,
this article will contrast the Mitchell and Zelman cases to discuss
the relevance of the Lemon test for Pedreira and to consider its
status. In Mitchell, the Court provided the following test for
determining whether the government violated the Establishment
Clause by providing funding to a religious organization.
Governmental funding is unconstitutional if:
1. It lacks a secular purpose;
2. It advances or inhibits religion in principal or
primary effect, which is demonstrated by
(a) funding that results in governmental
indoctrination; and,
(b) defining its recipients by reference to
religion; or,
3. The funding creates excessive entanglement
35
between government and religion.
33
34
35

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08.
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The Mitchell plurality modified the Lemon test through the
addition of 2 (a) and (b), which is the statement of the Lemon test
in Agostini v. Felton.36 The Lemon test treated excessive
entanglement as a separate criterion, but in Agostini and Mitchell,
criterion three is part of the test to determine
whether
37
governmental funding advances or inhibits religion.
In Mitchell, the Court considered the constitutionality of
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
of 1981.38 Under this law, the federal government was allowed to
distribute funds to state and local agencies. These agencies could
then lend educational materials and equipment to public and
private schools. The number of students enrolled in the school
determined the amount of Chapter 2 funds that the school
received. Each year approximately 30 percent of the Chapter 2
funds were distributed to private schools. 39 Many of these private
schools were religiously affiliated.
Justice Thomas, writing for a plurality of four justices,
first noted that Chapter 2 aid was distributed on the basis of
neutral and secular criteria. 40 He then noted that because the
statute contained a provision preventing federal funds from
replacing non-federal funds, the second criterion of advancing or
inhibiting religion was not violated. 41 The third part of the test
was not violated because Chapter 2 funds did not go directly to a
42
religious school's funds.
To determine whether indoctrination can be attributed to
the government, the plurality noted that the Court has consistently

36

521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997). Agostini merged prongs two and three of the

17

Lemon test. As discussed below, despite their merger, an analysis of
Pedreirabenefits from separate consideration of prongs two and three.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801-02.
Id. at 203.

38

39

40
41
42

Id at 829.
Id. at 830.
Id.
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turned to the neutrality principle. 43
requires the Court to uphold:

The neutrality principle

[state] aid that is offered to a broad range of
groups or persons without
regard to their
religion. If the religious,
irreligious,
and
areligious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination
that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government.44
To determine whether governmental funding defines its
recipients by reference to a religion, the Court asked "whether the
criteria for allocating the aid 'create[s] a financial incentive to
undertake religious indoctrination.' ', 45 Justice Thomas turned to
the rule set out in Agostini:
This incentive is not present, however, where the
aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and
is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Under
such circumstances, the aid is less likely to have
the effect of advancing religion.46
In her concurring opinion in Mitchell, Justice O'Connor
explained that the Court has recognized the dangers of the
Establishment Clause where the government makes direct money
payments to sectarian institutions. 47 "To be sure, the plurality does
41

44
45

Id. at 829.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 813 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231).

46

Id.

47

Id. at 840.
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not actually hold that its theory extends to direct money
payments. '48 Justice O'Connor distinguished between direct and
indirect aid, "a per-capita-aid program and a true private-choice
program when considering aid that consists of direct monetary
subsidies., 49 The key to whether the government is advancing
religion is whether the student receives aid and then applies it to
his education. "The fact that aid flows to the religious school and
is used for the advancement of religion is therefore wholly
dependent on the student's private decision." 50 In addition, Justice
O'Connor stated that "neutrality is an important reason for
upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause
challenges," but "neutrality is not alone sufficient to qualify the
aid as constitutional. ' 5'
Based on Marks v. United States,52 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Mitchell probably states the law of the case since
her concurrence is more narrow, but this issue will be discussed
further when examining the Zelman case below. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that Justice O'Connor's opinion is the narrower
of the plurality and consequently considered the Court's holding
in Mitchell.
The Court's decisions since Lemon have elaborated on
each component of the Lemon test. In Edwards v. Aguillard,53 the
Court articulated the test for determining whether governmental
funding lacks a secular purpose. This test is whether the primary
54
purpose of the law "is to advance a particular religious belief.9
In Edwards, the Court found that the State of Louisiana had not
intended to fulfill a secular purpose based on the law's statutory
history. 55 More recently, in Santa Fe Independent School District
Id at 844 (citing at 818-20 of the plurality's decision).
Id. at 842.
50 Id. at 842.
5' Id. at 840.
48

49

430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
3 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
54 Id. at 593.
52

5' Id. at 586-87.
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v. Doe,56 the Supreme Court identified the law to endorse school
prayer where the Santa Fe Independent School District allowed
students to decide electorally whether to hold invocations at
football games. 57 The Court found that the invocation generally
advanced
religion, which violated the Lemon test's second
58
prong.
In Bowen v. Kendrick,59 the Court enunciated a test to
determine whether governmental funding advances or inhibits
religion in principal or primary effect. Governmental funding
advances or inhibits religion when it: (a) results in governmental
indoctrination;
or, (b) defines its recipients by reference to
religion. 6 1 The Court stated that the plaintiff must show that aid is
used for "specifically religious activities," the use or creation of
materials with "explicitly religious content," the use or creation of
materials "designed to inculcate the views of particular faith," or
the teaching of "religious doctrines of a particular sect" for aid,
otherwise it is unconstitutional.62
Bowen included both
"facial" and
"applied"
constitutional challenges to the Adolescent Family Life Act.
Under the Act, grants were awarded to religious and other
institutions that offered counseling on teenage sexuality. 63 A
"facial" challenge seeks to determine whether the law is
constitutional on its face. An "applied" challenge asks whether the
application of the law is constitutional. The Court held that the
act was "facially valid," but remanded the case to the District
Court for the District of Columbia for further deliberation on how

56

530 U.S. 290 (2000).

57

Id. at 296.
Id. at315.

58
'9

60
61
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487 U.S. 589 (1988).
Id. at 612.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 613, 621-22.
Id. at 593.
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the Act was administered.64 The District Court had identified
certain instances of impermissible behavior by grantees, but had
not evaluated to the satisfaction of the Court whether grant money
had been used to fund specifically religious activities or whether
secular purposes and religious missions of some organizations
were inextricably intertwined.
Bowen indicates that an unconstitutional finding will not
be made merely if government funding is made to a religious
institution, but whether governmental funding is used for religious
activities. The Court held that the government must determine
whether governmental ftnded materials have an explicitly
religious content or are meant to inculcate a specific faith's views.
Finally, if views are exhorted on a question, it is not sufficient to
show a primary effect of advancing religion if those views
coincide with that faith's views. This last component of the Court's
holding seems circular and thus problematic. It seems possible, for
instance, that individuals could fail to differentiate those religious
views from broader views that dominate the community in which
they live, despite those community views having a religious basis.
To determine whether the government has become
excessively entangled in religion, the Court has asked whether the
government supervises funding to ensure that a secular purpose is
met and the secular effect does not too heavily involve state
authorities. 65 As described above, the question is whether funds
are strictly used for secular purposes and whether funding
restrictions can be effectively imposed.66
In 2002, the Court decided Zelman. In that case, an Ohio
state pilot program provided assistance to parents of children in
specific public schools. The program provided tuition assistance
that allowed parents to select among participating public and
private schools for the education of their children who attended
64
65

66

Id. at 622.

See generally Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
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kindergarten through third grade. The program also provided tutor
assistance for children who were enrolled in public schools." The
Court noted that any private school within specified geographic
boundaries may participate in this program.
The Court also stated that "[t]he Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the
'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."68 The
Court found that no party disputed the secular purpose of the
program.
The remaining question was whether the program had the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 69 To answer this
question, the Court's decisions have distinguished between
programs that directly provide aid to religious schools and
programs of "true private choice, in which government aid reaches
religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent
choices of private individuals." 70 This component of Zelman
further indicates the importance of the difference between "a percapita-aid program and a true-private-choice program" described
by Justice O'Connor in Mitchell.71 The Court concluded that the
Ohio program permitted individuals "to exercise genuine choice
among options public and private, secular and religious. The
program [was] therefore a program of true private choice." 72 The
majority also noted that the Cleveland program was neutral and
available to secular and religious beneficiaries in accordance with
Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 73 Consequently, the Court held
that the Ohio program did not violate the Establishment Clause.
67

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2460.

68

Id. at 2463 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23).
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Id. at 2465.
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id.
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Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842.
Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2473.
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id.
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Not once does the Court's Zelman opinion mention Lemon
or refer to the Lemon test. Perhaps the omission is meaningless or
only symbolic, but Justice O'Connor's concurrence highlights it
by insisting the majority's opinion is not "a major departure from
this Court's prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 7 4 Justice
O'Connor maintains that the Court continues to rely on the Lemon
test, with the Zelman decision modestly modifying the Lemon
7
test. 1

In sum, to determine the constitutionality of governmental
financial support of a religious organization, the Court typically
applies the Lemon test. Each component of the Lemon test has
been elaborated in subsequent decisions. More recently, in
Zelman, the Court asserted its examination of the Establishment
Clause that focuses on whether the legislation at issue has the
purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 76 Here, we
will consider each component of the two tests, the Lemon test and
the Zelman test, for the Pedreiracase. The District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky has ruled on a motion for summary
judgment made by the Pedreiradefendants. Summary judgment is
granted when no material or factual issue is contested and when
the moving party prevails as a matter of law. 77
Considering the motion for summary judgment, the
District Court stated that Kentucky provided direct monetary
assistance to KBHC. The District Court noted that the plaintiffs
contend that federal funds are reaching the coffers of KBHC,
KBHC is using these federal funds for religious activities, and that
KBHC is a pervasively sectarian institution. The plaintiffs
conceded that the funding program under which KBHC receives
its funds goes to both secular and sectarian institutions.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the District
Court stated that Mitchell does not apply to Pedreirabecause
74
71

Id.at 2476.
Id.at 2473

76

Id. at 2465.
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Kentucky provides direct monetary assistance to KBHC. Further,
the Kentucky state government asserted that its allocation of funds
was neutral. The District Court, however, noted that the Mitchell
plurality opinion does not state a majority opinion. Instead, the
District Court relied on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Mitchell, which states that "neutrality is not alone sufficient to
78
qualify the aid as constitutional.,
The District Court also asserted that Bowen was relevant
because both facial and applied challenges to the constitutionality
of the Adolescent Family Life Act were made in that case. The
Supreme Court in Bowen said that the District Court must
evaluate whether "grant money had been used to fund specifically
religious activities, or whether secular purposes and religious
mission of certain organizations were inextricably intertwined. 7 9
The District Court highlighted two factors that
distinguished Bowen from Pedreira. First, KBHC directly
receives funds from the Kentucky state government, which is an
important distinction according to the criteria of the Lemon test.
Second, these funds allegedly are used for religious activities.
Plaintiffs allege that public funds were being "expended on care
and services infused with the teachings of the Baptist faith." 80 In
Pedreira, the plaintiffs concede that the funding program had a
secular purpose and acknowledge that funding was provided to
both secular and sectarian institutions. The plaintiffs further
allege that public funds were spent on activities that advanced
religion. 8 1 The District Court concluded that the allegations in the

78

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840.

As discussed above, reliance on Justice

O'Connor's concurrence is supported by Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
'9 Pedreira,186 F. Supp. 2d at 763 (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621).
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Id.

In regards to advancing religion to make its decision for Pedreira, the
District Court will probably consider Bd of Educ., 392 U.S. at 236,
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203, and Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793. As noted above,
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complaint were sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted and denied the motion for summary judgment.
It is unclear what impact Zelman will have on Pedreira.
Nevertheless, the District Court will most likely consider Zelman
in its decisions. It is important to note that Zelman is
distinguishable from the Pedreirain that the state government of
Kentucky directly provided aid to KBHC, while Zelman deals
with indirect aid to a service provider. Zelman basically directs
the District Court to focus on whether the funded program has the
purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The District
Court, as described above, has denied a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of advancing religion.
ENDORSEMENT TEST
The Endorsement Test addresses whether the government
violates the Establishment Clause by endorsing a religion. In
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Pittsburgh
Chapter,82 the Court stated that the government unconstitutionally
endorses a religion if the practice conveys a message that religion
is "favored," "preferred," or "promoted" over other beliefs.
The government of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
allowed a religious organization to display a nativity
representation inside the main part of the courthouse. The nativity
representation bore a plaque indicating the donor, the Holy Name
Society, which was a Roman Catholic group. 83 Christmas carols
and other songs were sung by participants of the nativity
representation from December 3 to December 23, 1986, with
programs sometimes lasting two hours. 84 The county government
publicly announced and identified itself as the sponsor of the
85
choral program.

83

492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Id. at 579.

84

Id. at 581.

85

id.

82
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A separate representation, outside an office building
owned by the city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County consisted
of (1) a 45-foot Christmas tree, (2) an 18-foot menorah, and (3) a
sign bearing a message that the city salutes liberty during the
holiday season. The tree was erected on November 17, 1986. The
sign was placed at the tree's base a few days later, and the
menorah was erected next to the tree on December 22, 1986.86 All
were removed on January 13, 1987.87
The majority held that the county violated the
Establishment Clause by endorsing and associating itself with the
nativity representation. The violation resulted from a plaque
indicating the donor, the nativity representation being in the
county courthouse, and the choral programs being held next to the
nativity representation and publicly announced as being sponsored
by the county. 88 On the other hand, the Court did not agree with
the opinion regarding the menorah, but six justices agreed that it
89
did not violate the Establishment Clause.

86

Id. at 581-82.
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Id. at 587.
Id. at 599-602.

'9 Id. at 621.
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Justice O'Connor held different views on these questions,
concurring in part.90 Justice O'Connor stated that since the
nativity representation was on public property and included
traditional Christian symbols, it effectively conveyed the
government's endorsement of Christianity. 91 In contrast, the
menorah display was not the government's endorsement of
Judaism. 92 Considering its physical setting, the menorah conveyed
a message of pluralism and freedom of belief.93 Joined by
Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice O'Connor stated that the
Endorsement Test should not be replaced by a test that "prohibits
only 'coercive' practices or overt efforts at government
proselytization." 94 That is, the Court should question whether the
government has established a religion through endorsement
95
resulting from direct as well as indirect, subtle "favoritism."
The majority in Allegheny seemed to indicate that the
Allegheny government had taken a position with regard to
religion, thereby endorsing it. The majority stated that the
Establishment Clause "prohibits [the] government from appearing
to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community.' 96 In cases before Allegheny, the
Court has said it will examine a religion or religious practice to
determine if the government's endorsement of it conveys that
97
religion is "favored" or "preferred.,
90

Id.

at 623.

9' Id.at
92
93

94
9'
96

97

625-26.

Id. at 634.
Id. at 635.

Id. at 627.
Id.at 627-28.
Id. at 594 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor,
J.,
concurring)).
An important case leading to Allegheny is Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
70 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor wrote
a concurring opinion in Wallace stating that the Endorsement Test "does
preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 472
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The distinction between direct financial support of a
service provider and the beneficiary (or his guardian) choosing
how to use the aid appears to be connected to whether the
government is perceived as endorsing a specific religion or
religion in general. In Mueller v. Allen, 98 the Court suggested that
the choice of an individual "does not 'confer any imprimatur of
State approval."' Instead, if aid is neutrally available and the
beneficiary chooses how to use that aid, the government has not
provided any "support of religion.99
Although Zelman does not directly apply to an analysis of
the Endorsement Test, Justice O'Connor pointed to the distinction
between providing direct aid to a service provider and allowing
the beneficiary of governmental aid to choose the provider on
whom to spend the assistance. She stated that the public
perception of governmental endorsement is "meaningfully"
different when the government provides direct aid to the service
provider as opposed to the beneficiary who decides how to use it.
The Endorsement Test should be considered in Pedreira.
It is reasonable to take the perspective of the child who is
receiving services from KBHC. Does the child view the state of
Kentucky as taking a position on Christian (Baptist) beliefs
because of its financial support of KBHC? Beyond financial
support, does the child view the state of Kentucky as taking a
position on Christian beliefs because the state places the child
with KBHC for services? It is unclear whether the Court would
accept the perspective of the child or a "reasonable person," or
how the court may distinguish between a child's perspective or a
"reasonable person."

98

U.S. at 70. The Allegheny Court referred to O'Connor's concurrence in
Wallace when reviewing advancement of religion and, in particular,
governmental endorsement of religion or religious belief.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454

U.S. 263, 275 (1981)).
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Nevertheless, some cases have considered whether children are
subject to coercion. Therefore, we now turn to the Coercion Test.
THE COERCION TEST
The Coercion Test addresses whether the government
violates the Establishment Clause by coercing religious beliefs.
Lee v. Weisman l°° deals with the issue of prayer offered in a
public school's graduation ceremony. In Lee, the Court stated that
unconstitutional coercion occurs when the government directs a
formal religious exercise in such a way as to oblige the
0
participation of objectors. ' '
The School Committee of Providence, Rhode Island,
allowed public high school and middle school principals to invite
clergy members to lead prayers as part of schools' graduation
ceremonies. A rabbi was invited by a principal to lead a prayer in
such a ceremony. 10 2 The rabbi was given a pamphlet that
suggested public prayers for nonsectarian civic ceremonies be
composed with inclusiveness and sensitivity. The principal also
recommended to the rabbi that the invocation and benediction be
nonsectarian. A graduating student's father filed a lawsuit in
which he asked the court to prevent school officials from
including an invocation or a benediction as part of the graduation
ceremony. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy
and joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter,
held that the Establishment Clause forbids a prayer led by a clergy
member at a public secondary school graduation where state
officials direct the performance of such a formal religious exercise
and the state practically requires attendance and participation.
The Lee court was concerned over subjecting adolescents
to religious exercise. It noted that "adolescents are often
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and
'00 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
'0 Id.at 586.
102 Id.at 581.
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that the influence is strongest in matters of social convention.' 10 3
In Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe,10 4 the Court held
that a prayer given at a high school football game violated the
Establishment Clause. It noted that prayer forces students to
choose between attending the game and staying away to affirm
10 5
their personal convictions.
Lee is distinguishable from Pedreira because the latter
does not involve a public school. Given that the Charitable Choice
Policy will influence social services for abused children, the
issues involving the Coercion Test are reasonable to consider. It
seems relevant to ask, considering the Bush Charitable Choice
Policy, whether public officials violate the Coercion Test if they
place a child in an organization that provides child abuse services
while sponsoring formal and informal religious exercises. In
addition, the court would be concerned about the beneficiaries of
KBHC's services, and the abused children because they are
vulnerable to pressures from their peers and KBHC officials.
The issue is whether children are especially susceptible to
coercion. The Court in Santa Fe Independent School District
stated "adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their
peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
06
matters of social convention."'1
SEPARATION OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS?
Another concern to evaluate is the fuzzy boundary
separating the public and private sectors. For purposes of this
study, an important question to consider is under what conditions
does a private organization become similar to a public
103 Id.at 593.
104

530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
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Id.at 312.
Id. at 311-312 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 593).
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organization? If sufficiently similar, will a private organization be
held to standards applied to a public organization? Questions that
must be answered are whether a religious provider that receives
public funds to provide a social service to abused children is a
state actor and at what point does an organization become a state
actor. The answer to these questions raises separate issues and
provides a distinct perspective for Pedreira and, the Bush
Charitable Choice Policy.
A private actor becoming a state actor can be analyzed
from different perspectives. For the purposes of this article, we
will examine "public trust" and "public function." What is a
public trust? The Claims Court states that "transactions relating to
the expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of
public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct."' 7 Is the
receipt of public funds and their use in providing social services to
abused children a public trust? Robert Destro suggests that a
public trust can be a situation in which a religious organization
enters a contract with the government to fulfill some objectives
08
like providing welfare services to abused children. 1
The notion of public trust is important because of its role
in the Test Clause. The Test Clause is part of Article VI of the
Constitution, which states that:
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be
Refine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 12 CI. Ct. 56, 63 (1987).
'0' Robert Destro, Equal Treatment: Implications for
107

Nonprofit

Organizations, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY 101-35 (Stephen V. Monsma and Christopher Soper eds. 1998).
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the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any state to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives
before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no
religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States. 109
The Test Clause is the portion of Article VI that reads: "[N]o
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States."
The Test Clause has not received much attention by the
Court or other courts. 110 Consequently, lawyers and academics
have little foundation on which to analyze the Test Clause to
direct public funds to religious organizations that offer welfare
services. To determine whether it is relevant to this question, the
Test Clause can be broken into three separate elements: (1) no
religious test shall ever be required, (2) as a qualification, and (3)
to any office or public trust.

art. VI.

109

U.S.CONST.

110

See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 355 n. 59 (1995). Robert Destro contends
that "it is arguable that the explicit non-discrimination norm of the Test
Clause applies not only to federal employment, but also to federal
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If we accept the components of the Test Clause, then the
first question is what is a religious test? According to Destro, a
religious test is "any device that operates to screen out persons
whose religious beliefs or practices, including the taking of oaths,
are thought, for reasons of policy or prejudice, to make them unfit
to hold a public office or become the custodian of a public
'
trust."111
If a government grant or contract recipient is the holder
of a public trust either under the United States or the law of any
state with a similar provision, the test clause not only is relevant
but may be controlling. 1 2 As Destro
points out, the
"qualification" component does not apply to an organization
because it cannot hold office. 113 Can a religious organization hold
a public trust? Destro goes on to suggest that a policy precluding a
religious organization from holding a public trust would be
"illegitimate."114
In the context of Pedreiraas well as the Bush Charitable
Choice Policy, it is reasonable to ask whether a religious
organization like KBHC must meet "the highest degree of public
trust." The idea of public trust seems to apply to KBHC because it
received government funds to provide services to one of the most
vulnerable social groups in the United States, abused children. It
is unclear what standards a private, religious organization must
meet in fulfilling a public trust.
Another important question is whether a private religious
organization is fulfilling its public function. There are two reasons
that the receipt of public funds to provide social services to
abused children are complex in the context of public function.
First, the state
collects funds and contracts with private
organizations to provide social services to abused children. What
responsibility has the .state assumed by collecting tax revenue for
the purpose of providing these services? What responsibility has
111 Id.
112
113

"14

Town of Fallsburg v. U.S., 22 CI. Ct. 633 (1991).

Destro, supra note 110, at 120.
Id. at 121.
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the private religious organization assumed by contracting to
provide these services? What would happen if these private
organizations decided to "quit" and no longer contracted to
provide social services to abused children? Would the state be
expected to provide these social services? In turn, it is unlikely
that a state government could force a religious organization like
KBHC to continue to provide social services to abused children if
that religious organization decided to quit. In addition to its
collection and distribution of tax revenue, the state is also
responsible for addressing child abuse 5as a public health issue,
which is a governmental responsibility."
It is unclear as to when the activity of a private actor
becomes state action. In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association,116 the Court examined
whether the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
(TSSAA) was a state actor. To determine whether TSSAA was a
state actor, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had
employed this test:
1. Whether the TSSAA had a symbiotic relationship
with the state;
2. Whether the TSSAA was engaging in a traditional
and exclusive public function; and,
3. Whether the TSSAA was responding to state
compulsion.117
However, the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit's
decision. Five justices formed the majority, with Justice Souter
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See generally DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE:
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writing the majority's opinion. The purpose of the test was to
determine if TSSAA was a state actor:
1. Whether the state was pervasively entwined with
TSSAA's structure; and
2. Whether there was a substantial reason to claim
unfairness in applying constitutional standards to
the TSSAA.
Four justices strongly dissented with the majority's
opinion. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thomas,
indicated that:
1. Entwinement by itself does not constitute state
action;
2. Instead, state action by a private organization is
evident when it:
(a) performs a public function;
(b) is created, coerced, or encouraged by the
government; or,
(c) acts in a symbiotic relationship with the
government.
Indeed, the majority's notion of entwinement appears to be
an innovation in determining whether a private organization is
acting as the state. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn," 8 the Court
articulated a similar test to the TSSAA dissent:
1. Whether the private actor is compelled or
influenced by state regulation; and
2. Whether there is a symbiotic relationship between
the private actor and the state.

118

457 U.S. 830 1982).
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In Rendell-Baker, the Court stated that it will not only look
at whether a private actor is serving a public function, but whether
the state has the exclusive prerogative over it. The Rendell-Baker
Court, however, described other holdings that articulated different
tests of whether a private actor can be considered the state. For
instance, in a footnote in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company," 9 the
Court explained that a private actor who conspired with a state
actor, a sheriff, to deprive an individual of her rights, had acted
under the color of state law.
An important case described by the Rendell-Baker Court is
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 120 which articulates the standard
of whether the action was taken in concert with a state actor. In
FlaggBrothers, the Court found that no state actor was involved,
so the private organization could not be considered a state actor.
The Court mentioned in dicta that it was possible to find a private
actor acting as a state actor if the private actor acted pursuant to
state law and consequently appeared to be coerced by it.
The Rendell-Baker Court also reviewed Blum v.
Yaretsky. 121 The test articulated in the Blum was whether the state
exercised coercive power or provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the state. The Court considered the facts
of Blum noting that nursing homes depended on the state for
funds. The state subsidized the operating and capital costs of the
nursing homes and paid the medical expenses of more than 90
percent of the patients. The Court explicitly stated that
dependence on state funds did not make the decisions of the
nursing homes to discharge the patients acts of the state. Further,
the Court stated, "[a]cts of such private contractors do not become
acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total
engagement in performing public contracts."

120
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The second factor considered in Blum was the extensive
regulation of the nursing homes by the state. In Blum, the Court
said the decision to discharge the patients was not compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation. The third factor was
whether the private actor performs a public function. The Court
said the question is not whether the private actor is serving a
"public function," but whether the function has been "traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State."' 2 2 The Court said that
education of "maladjusted high school students" is a public
function, but that conclusion is only the first step in the inquiry.
The fourth factor is whether a symbiotic relationship exists
between the private actor and the state, which was found in
Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority. 123 In Burton, the Court
found that a restaurant was located on public property and that
rent from the restaurant contributed to the support of the state.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have sought to describe an instance in
which the boundary separating the public and private sectors is
fuzzy. As various commentators have noted, including Destro,
"[I]n the modem administrative state, the dividing lines between
public and private endeavor have been blurred."' 124 This article
has analyzed the intersection of public health and separation of
church and state. Child abuse is a public health matter, yet
throughout the United States, child abuse services are frequently
provided by private providers. Often these providers are religious
organizations.
Pedreira raises important questions for the provision of
child abuse services and separation of church and state. This
lawsuit, in turn, is useful for understanding the impact and future
of Charitable Choice Policy. Together, Pedreiraand Charitable
Id. at 1011 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
12' 665 U.S. 715 (1961).
124 Destro, supra note 110, at
10 1-35.
122

(1974)).
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Choice Policy have important implications for the future of public
health and separation of church and state. Will public health
responsibilities increasingly become responsibilities of private
organizations, in particular religious organizations, with the state
as the silent partner? To what standards can taxpayers hold
religious organizations as partners of the government?
Pedreira shines a light on current Charitable Choice
Policy and the Bush Charitable Choice Policy. Children and
particularly abused children often are vulnerable because they are
without full legal rights and must rely on others for protection.
Given the association shared by religious organizations with
public health organizations appears essential to providing services
to abused children in the United States, it is fair to ask whether
abused children are and will be placed in circumstances that other
individuals and social groups are not placed in. Is the relationship
between public health and religious organizations failing to close
holes in the safety net for vulnerable children? Indeed, we must go
further and ask whether public health organizations and Charitable
Choice Policy are devising a social service structure for abused
children that we would not and could not impose on individuals
capable of full social, economic, and political participation in U.S.
society.

